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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARGARET B. HALL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND 
CONTROL, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 





* Appeal No. 920332-CA 
* Priority 16 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully petitions the Court 
for a rehearing. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A DETERMINATION THAT THE 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WAS "INTEGRATED" AND IT WAS NOT PROPER FOR 
THIS COURT TO INFER THAT IT DID. 
In its Opinion dated December 28, 1993, this Court affirmed 
the trial courtf s holding that the parol evidence rule rendered 
inadmissible Mrs. Hall's testimony that the parties never 
intended that she would go to work for Defendant under the 
Employment Agreement. The Court explained as follows: 
The trial court ... found, after reviewing evidence of the 
contract's integration, that the terms of the employment 
agreement appeared to be "complete and certain." After reviewing the 
employment agreement at issue, we agree. The employment 
agreement unambiguously provides that Mrs. Hall agreed to 
work for Process for a period of three years at a monthly 
compensation of $1000. There is no mention in the contract 
of alimony, nor is Mrs. Hall's agreement to work for 
Process qualified in any way. In addition, Mr. Hall testified that 
the parties intended this agreement to be a valid and binding employment 
agreement. 
Opinion at p. 4 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court's holding in regard 
to the parol evidence issue on the grounds that the Employment 
Agreement appears to be complete and certain and that Mr. Hall 
testified that "the parties intended this agreement to be a valid 
and binding employment contract." 
Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that in affirming the trial 
court's application of the parol evidence rule the Court has 
failed to properly apply the well settled law of this state. 
In Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court recognized that the parol evidence rule has a very 
narrow application. Before the rule may be applied to exclude 
otherwise admissible evidence, a court must first determine 
whether the writing was intended by the parties to be an 
integration. Id. In other words, a court must first make a 
determination that the parties intended for the writing to represent their full and 
complete agreement Colonial leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 
731 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986). 
In the case at bar, the trial court did not make the 
required threshold finding that the parties int€inded for the 
Employment Agreement to represent their "full and complete 
agreement.H What the trial court did find was that the terms of the 
Employment Agreement were "clear and unambiguous and appear to be 
complete and certain." (R. 00171). 
In making its determination as to whether the Employment 
Agreement was intended to be the full and complete agreement 
2 
between the parties, however, the trial court was not entitled to 
simply look at the face of the document to see if it appeared to 
be complete and certain. Union Bank, supra at 665. To the 
contrary, the trial court was required to specifically "determine 
as a question of fact whether the parties did in fact adopt [the 
writing] as the final and complete expression of their bargain." 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972). 
As the Union Bank Court recognized: 
What appears to be a complete and binding integrated 
agreement may be a ... joke, a sham . . . Such 
invalidating causes need not and commonly do not appear 
on the face of the writing. 
707 P.2d at 665 (emphasis added). 
This Court appears to have inferred that the trial court did 
make a determination that the Employment Agreement was an 
integration based upon the trial court's finding that "Plaintiff 
was allowed to introduce parole (sic) evidence, subject to 
exclusion, in order to attempt to establish that the agreement 
was not either an integration or a partially integrated 
contract." (R.00172). Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that such 
an inference was not proper. The trial court was required to 
make specific, detailed findings on all material issues, 
including what has turned out to be the central issue in this 
case: whether the Employment Agreement was intended to represent 
the full and complete agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Acton 
v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)(findings should be 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps by 
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which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached); 
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)(trial court 
should make findings on all material issues tried by the 
parties); and Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P. 2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 
1979)(findings are not sufficient to support judgment until the 
trial court has found on all material issues raised by the 
pleadings). 
Furthermore, the If[f]ailure of the trial court to make 
findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the 
facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.1" Acton, 
supra at 999 (quoting from Kinkella, supra at 236). There is no 
question that the facts in the record of this case are not clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding that the 
Employment Agreement was integrated and, therefore, subject to 
the parol evidence rule1. 
xNot only did Mrs. Hall testify that the Employment 
Agreement was not intended to be the parties1 full and complete 
agreement, but Mr. Hall and his attorney both testified that it 
was not the full and complete agreement. (Trial Tr. at p. 64, 
lines 8-22; and p. 119, lines 13-23). Furthermore, after Mrs. 
Hall and Mr. Hall had both testified with respect to their 
intent, the trial court ridiculed Defendant's argument that the 
parties actually expected Mrs. Hall to go to work for Mr. Hall. 
(Trial Tr. at p. 72, lines 14-17; p. 73, lines 3-4; p. 74, lines 
9-20). 
4 
Accordingly, Mrs. Hall respectfully requests that this case 
be remanded to the trial court with instruction for the entry of 
specific findings on the issue of whether or not the parties 
intended for the Employment Agreement to represent their full and 
complete agreement. 
II. MR. TURLEYfS TESTIMONY WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN RELEVANT TO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF THE "INTEGRATION" ISSUE. 
In footnote 2 of its Opinion, the Court summarily dismisses 
Mrs. Hall's argument that the trial court abused its discretion 
in not admitting Mr. Brent Turleyfs testimony that Mr. Hall once 
offered him a salaried position with Defendant, where Mr. Turley 
would not actually have had to work, in lieu of a down payment 
for the purchase of Mr. Turleyfs home. The Court explains as 
follows: 
Given the trial courtf s determination that the terms of 
the employment agreement were clear and unambiguous, 
there was no need for evidence regarding Mr. Hall's 
intent in drafting this contract. Therefore, the trial 
court's decision to exclude Turley's testimony on 
grounds of relevance was a legitimate exercise of 
discretion. 
Again, Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that the Court has 
failed to properly apply the relevant law. 
In making its determination as to whether the Employment 
Agreement was intended to represent the "full and complete" 
agreement between the parties, i.e., whether it was an 
"integration", the trial court was required to consider all relevant 
evidence, parol and written. Union Bank, supra at 665 
("Protection against judicial enforcement of writings that appear 
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to be binding integrations but in fact are not lies in the 
provision that all relevant evidence is admissible on the 
threshold issue of whether the writing was adopted by the parties 
as an integration of their agreement. This appears to be so even 
if the writing clearly states it to be a complete and final 
statement of the parties1 agreement"); Eie v. St. Benedictfs 
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981)("Whether a document was 
or was not adopted as an integration may be proved by any 
relevant evidence"). 
There is no question that Mr. Turleyfs testimony would have 
been relevant to the question of whether the parties intended for 
the Employment Agreement to represent their full and complete 
agreement. As the Court recognizes, Mr. Turley would have 
testified that Mr. Hall had attempted to use an employment 
contract with his company (containing terms virtually identical 
to those at issue in the case at bar, including that Mr. Turley 
would not be required to go to work for Mr. Hall's company) as 
the down payment on the purchase of Mr. Turley's home. In other 
words, Mr. Turley would have testified that on at least one other 
occasion Mr. Hall had attempted to use an employment contract 
with his company as consideration for the payment of his own 
personal obligations. This testimony would clearly have had a 
tendency to make it more probable that the consideration promised 
and given by Mrs. Hall for Defendant's obligations under the 
Employment Agreement was not her promise to go to work for 
Defendant (as indicated on the face of the Employment Agreement), 
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but, rather, was her promise to forego her claim to alimony in 
the divorce proceedings simultaneously taking place between 
herself and Mr. Hall. 
By definition, then, Mr. Turley's testimony would have been 
relevant to the issue of whether the parties intended for the 
Employment Agreement to represent their "full and complete 
agreement." Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. Therefore, 
because the trial court was required to consider all relevant 
evidence in making the determination as to whether the Employment 
Agreement was an integration, Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that 
it is clear that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to admit Mr. Turleyfs testimony. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Hall requests that this case be remanded 
to the trial court and that the trial court be instructed to hear 
and consider Mr. Turley?s testimony in making its determination 
on the issue of whether the Employment Agreement was intended to 
represent the full and complete agreement between the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mrs. Hall respectfully requests 
that her Petition for Rehearing be granted. Mrs. Hall further 
requests that, upon rehearing, this case be remanded to the trial 
court with instructions for the entry of specific findings on the 
issue of whether or not the Employment Agreement was intended to 
represent the full and complete agreement between the parties and 
with instructions that Mr. Turley's testimony be heard and 
considered in that regard. 
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